Treaties or Constitution? Mexico’s False Dilemma in Complying with the Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

This article discusses the disjunction between constitutional supremacy and Inter-American standards, which emerged in Mexico following two recent judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that mandate constitutional amendments by the State. This study introduces the notion of duality to elucidate the relationship between the Court and the States. According to this framework, the Court’s authority is dual in nature, as it possesses the faculty to mandate States to implement significant changes in their constitutional law, yet it lacks the power to ensure immediate and unconditional compliance with its orders. Concurrently, this duality is also characteristic of the States Parties, as they initially commit to adhering to the Court’s orders; however, such compliance ultimately depends on their own conditions. Utilising this proposed duality model, this study explores the potential evolution of the current Mexican disjunction and suggests a possible resolution, interpreting it as a false dilemma.