<b> <i>Quid Facti</i> </b> Between Kant and Maimon

There is substantial scholarship concerning the origin and use of the question “ quid facti ” in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. There is also substantial scholarship concerning the question in the work of Salomon Maimon, the skeptical critic of Kant. The pictures of the “ quid facti ” question that emerge from these two bodies of literature, however, are rather different, and there has been no attempt to reconcile them. The goal of this paper is thus to compare Kant’s and Maimon’s understandings of the quaestio facti in order to understand how and why they differ. Part I begins by summarizing the legal context of the quaestio facti and identifying three sub-questions within it. Part II lays out Kant’s understanding of the quid facti as concerning the question of the empirical origin of a judgment. Part III shows how Maimon’s skeptical use of the quid facti question was made possible by his focus on a different aspect of the legal question: the question of whether a judgment has been made. Finally, using these results, Part IV argues, against the usual interpretation, that Maimon’s skeptical use of the quaestio facti can stand alone, separate from the quaestio juris .