Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and ApplicationsGame Theory and Voting Systems

Christian Ewerhart

2026.4.1Journal of Public Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70105

Abstract

The ‐player Tullock contest with complete information is known to admit explicit solutions in special cases, such as (i) homogeneous valuations, (ii) constant returns, and (iii) two contestants. But can the model be solved more generally? In this paper, we show that key characteristics of the equilibrium, such as individual efforts, winning probabilities, and payoffs, cannot, in general, be expressed in terms of the primitives of the model using only basic arithmetic operations and the extraction of roots. In this sense, the Tullock contest is intractable. We argue that our formal concept of tractability captures the intuitive notion of the term.

Citation format

EWERHART, Christian. Solving the n‐player tullock contest. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2026, 28(2).