I Identify as Reason. Fichte’s First Principle of Philosophy and Rational Self-Realization

Abstract Fichte’s first principle is commonly understood as the absolute or self-positing I. Although this interpretation is not incorrect, it captures only a partial truth. The I that posits itself is intrinsically related to reason: the I is itself reason, and self-positing is the essence and original act of reason. This article argues that only a reason-contextual reading of the first principle reveals its full significance. The argument unfolds in two parts. The first examines a corpus of passages in which Fichte employs the term ‘reason’ and the conceptual frameworks that underlie it. The second addresses three questions arising from this analysis: whether the I is identical with reason; whether Fichte proposes a model that redefines the relation between reason and the I beyond Kant’s; and what strategies can be developed to sustain the reason-contextual reading.