When Wildfires Reward Incumbents: Risk Exposure and Electoral Accountability in Chile

This study examines how wildfires are associated with municipal electoral outcomes in Chile, a topic that has received limited attention in the literature on natural disasters and elections. Using georeferenced data for the period 2012–2021, the analysis looks at how wildfire magnitude interacts with pre-existing territorial risk and with the probability that incumbent mayors are re-elected. Drawing on risk perception theory and the literature on diffuse responsibility attribution in multi-level governance systems, the study argues that communities in high-risk territories develop accumulated expectations about wildfire occurrence and governmental response that systematically differ from those in low-risk areas. The results show that the electoral response to wildfires is not linear. In low-risk areas, large fires are associated with lower re-election probabilities for incumbents. By contrast, in high-risk areas, larger wildfires are linked to higher electoral support for incumbent mayors. These patterns suggest that voters’ evaluations depend on local risk conditions and on expectations about disaster management. In this context, short-term and visible responses appear to be more electorally salient than long-term preventive actions.