Rethinking a Heideggerian Normative Ethics

The latter Heidegger pointed out in his “Letter on ‘Humanism’” that prevailing ethical theories are all products of Western metaphysics, but there is in fact an “original ethics” before them. He claimed that the “original ethics” is better than the former but offered no further explanation. After previously attempting to establish a Heideggerian normative ethics based on authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) as virtue, and discovering its inherent difficulties of voluntarism, I try to ponder in this article another kind of normative ethics based on his concept of releasement (Gelassenheit) as a virtue in order to interpret a Heideggerian “original ethics.” The virtue of releasement doesn’t force Being as such to present itself and is able to make Dasein open to Being of the Other and let it be itself. To highlight the characteristics of this virtue ethics, this article will attempt to explore its possible content by comparing it with the previous version of ethics, namely the virtue ethics based on Heidegger's early concept of authenticity