Alexey I. Vvedensky: a prioriism and psychologism in the synthetic model of Christian metaphysics

The pre-revolutionary experience of Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy is fundamental to the contemporary debate between science and religion. Within the walls of Orthodox theological schools, a philosophical position was formed aimed at demonstrating the absence of contradictions between scientific, philosophical, and religious knowledge. Aleksey Ivanovich Vvedensky (1861–1913), a professor of philosophy at the Moscow Theological Academy, was among those whose views represented a strategy for resolving the confrontation between science and religion by constructing a synthetic model of metaphysics. While Kant's philosophy serves as the starting point, Vvedensky also draws on extensive empirical psychology to correct Kant. Therefore, it remains unclear how the Russian philosopher utilized the insights of the Königsberg philosopher, and whether one can speak of an epistemological shift from apriorism to psychologism in the philosophical school of the Moscow Theological Academy. The study shows that Vvedensky's views, like those of his teacher, V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov, retain the fundamental tenet of Kantian transcendentalism—the rejection of the unfounded projection of a priori forms of sensibility onto things in themselves. At the same time, Vvedensky departs from the epistemological views of Kudryavtsev-Platonov's modified Kantian apriorism, placing greater emphasis on the role of experience in shaping human perceptions. At the same time, a comparison of the philosophical positions of Vvedensky and F.E. Benecke reveals that the Russian philosopher's ideas cannot be classified as psychologistic. According to Vvedensky, the apodictic nature of human cognition is founded on an a priori component, including understanding and its categories. As a result, the conclusion is drawn that Vvedensky, by correcting Kant's transcendental aesthetics in light of new data from empirical psychology, does not thereby make an epistemological turn from apriorism to psychologism, but relies on a thesis close to the neo-Kantian position about the key role of thinking in cognition.