Presidential strategies and civilian control of the military in Indonesia: Managing political costs from authoritarianism to democratic consolidation

This article examines how Indonesia's presidents have managed Civil–Military Relations (CMR) from the final decade of Suharto's authoritarian rule (1988) to the democratic consolidation of the Joko Widodo era (2024). It argues that presidential strategy – rather than institutional inertia or external pressure – has been the principal driver of the country's evolving civil–military balance. Six distinct strategies are identified across the period: authoritarian absorption (Suharto), disengagement (Bacharuddin Jusuf (BJ) Habibie), confrontation (Abdurrahman Wahid-Gus Dur), neutrality (Megawati Sukarnoputri), institutional balancing (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-SBY) and technocratic containment (Joko Widodo-Jokowi). The analysis integrates Huntington's concept of subjective control with Schiff's concordance theory to explain why presidential actions varied in their effectiveness. Drawing on 45 elite interviews, legal and policy documents and triangulation with quantitative indices (Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem), Freedom House and Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC) - Global Militarization Index (GMI)), the study demonstrates that Indonesia's CMR evolved through negotiated adaptation rather than linear reform. The findings contribute to comparative debates on democratic control of the armed forces in post-authoritarian contexts.