Massimiliano Cappuccio
2026.1.1Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki
Abstract
Perconti’s paper argues that social cognition is more fundamental than self-consciousness and indeed forms its foundation. Drawing on perspectives from enactivism and empirical fields like social neuroscience, robotics, and performance psychology, the argument challenges the traditional view that self-consciousness represents the pinnacle of human cognition. Instead, the author maintains that intersubjectivity – manifested in experiences like joint attention and social attunement – is a prerequisite for developing self-awareness. This insight has implications for AI and robotics, where autonomy is often incorrectly equated with self-transparency or rational control, reflecting outdated Cartesian views. Contrary to this, both in natural and artificial cognition, intelligence often emerges from opaque, distributed, and unconscious processes. Moreover, optimal skilled performance in humans relies on embodied, non-conscious control rather than reflective self-awareness. Joint attention, as a key form of social cognition, not only underpins early cognitive development but also shapes skilled action, influencing perception and decision-making in subtle, often unnoticed ways. Therefore, self-consciousness is not the driver of cognition but a result of social, interactive dynamics. Perconti’s view urges a revision of how we understand consciousness, aligning cognitive science, AI, and philosophy of mind toward a more socially grounded, embodied perspective.
Citation format
CAPPUCCIO, Massimiliano. A commentary on “rethinking subjectivity. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki, 2026, 63(1): 41–47.