The Supertranscendental Backdrop of Antonio Pérez’s Proof for God’s Existence

The present essay considers the metaphysical thought of the late scholastic Jesuit Antonio Pérez (1599–1649). In particular, attention is given to his argument for God’s existence which is presented along the lines of an ontological argument broadly construed. Pérez’s formulation of the argument is unique in that it is framed in such a way that it denies that God is a chimera. If God is not a chimera, then God is not nothing, which is to say God is something. To speak of chimeras and impossible objects is to move beyond the realm of real being. In fact, Pérez thinks that real being itself can be defined by a larger genus of being, namely, intentional being. Indeed, as he says, intentional being is communior than even real being itself. I suggest, then, that what functions as the backdrop of Pérez’s argument is the notion of supertranscendentality. Though he does not use the term as such, the notion of supertranscendentality is now developed in such a way that it yields a proof for God’s existence.