Electoral incentives, blame-shifting, and crisis governance: the role of electoral correspondence in federal policy coordination

This paper examines how electoral incentives shape crisis-related policy engagement in federal systems during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis management requires active engagement from both national and sub-national authorities, yet many federations experienced fragmented responses. The study develops an electoral perspective on crisis governance by introducing the concept of electoral correspondence, which captures the alignment of national and sub-national election outcomes within a jurisdiction and reflects the behavioural dimension of integrated party systems.Using sub-national data from multiple federal systems, the analysis assesses whether closer correspondence is associated with greater policy engagement and more balanced burden sharing. Jurisdictions with higher correspondence exhibit higher levels of activity from both tiers and a more even distribution of crisis responsibilities.The findings contribute to research on federalism and crisis governance by demonstrating how electoral linkages interact with institutional environments and shape policymaker behaviour during high-risk events.