Secure control of wireless networked control systems subject to stochastic deception attacks

Given that power systems are essential to modern life and electricity demand continues to rise, ensuring their reliable and secure operation has become a critical priority. Wireless networked control systems (WNCSs), which rely on wireless channels for communication between controllers, sensors, and actuators, are increasingly deployed in energy systems such as multi-area interconnected power systems to enhance flexibility and scalability. WNCSs are susceptible to deception attacks and time-varying communication delays that can compromise interconnection stability and deteriorate performance. This paper presents an observer-based secure control methodology that models deception via independent Bernoulli processes with unknown attack probabilities, while explicitly considering actuation and measurement delays. Using a Lyapunov stability framework, we established computationally feasible linear matrix inequality conditions enabling the co-design of the controller and observer with proven stability and disturbance rejection. A two-area interconnected power system case study validates the approach. The proposed method was tested with offline gains covering nine scenarios. Results indicate that the method sustains closed-loop performance across all nine combined attack/delay scenarios and recovers quickly even in worst-case conditions, supporting secure control of WNCSs in realistic adversarial environments.