Dingteng Wang, Chengwei Liu, Shuping Wang
2026.3.10Games
Abstract
The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms’ adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment—specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms—effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform’s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation.
Citation format
WANG, Dingteng; LIU, Chengwei; WANG, Shuping. Platform empowerment and digital inclusion in industrial clusters: A complex network game analysis with performance feedback. Games, 2026, 17(2): 16.