Joshua Trubowitz, J. Stern, Evan Sommers, T. Holden, Steven M. Nadler, D. Ferguson, M. Nance, John J. Drummond, G. Catapano, James J. Dicenso, J. Greig, Christopher Litwin, Juan Carlos González, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, F. Zamboni, Mitia Rioux-Beaulne, S. Bremner
2026.3.31JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Abstract
abstract:A widespread view has it that, for Aristotle, perception's psychological and physiological aspects are phenomenal consciousness and its underlying material basis. I argue on the contrary that they are judgment/discrimination and receptivity: in virtue of our sense organs, we are receptive to objects of perception; in virtue of our souls, we judge or discriminate these objects. In effect, Aristotle divides perception's active and passive aspects between soul and body. I defend this view with special attention to Aristotle's claim that our senses receive form without matter in perception.
Citation format
TRUBOWITZ, Joshua, et al. Soul and body in aristotle's theory of perception. JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 2026, 64(2): 163–182–183–212–213–236–237–262–263–284–285–313–315–316–316–317–317.