‘Out, Damned Spot! Out, I Say!’

This article examines the function of disgust in Plato’s Laws and Republic , through two examples—the story of Leontius in the Republic and the description of ignoble comic dance in the Laws . It argues that disgust is an aesthetic (in the sense of αἴσθησις , sensory perception) and moral phenomenon, which is crucial to the Laws ’ and Republic ’s accounts of human motivation, self-control, and virtue. Specifically, disgust functions as a method of social and political control. This is possible because both dialogues view attraction and repulsion as reactions to what we love and hate, and aesthetics and ethics as fundamentally intertwined—every musical tune, dance step, word, and theatrical performance makes an ethical statement. Therefore, to educate citizens in virtue, they must experience, and learn to love, morally good art. Scholarship tends towards intellectualising this mimetic relationship, suggesting that after children are capable of reasoning about what is right, wrong, beautiful, and ugly, such reasoning takes priority in our judgements—we know what is good, so we love it, and find it beautiful. However, this view underplays the continued importance of aesthetic reactions throughout human life, and specifically the role of less pleasant aesthetic reactions, like disgust. As embodied, rational creatures, our reactions and judgements are determined and guided by reason and aesthetic impressions. This article proposes that, as a powerful psycho-physiological response, disgust is a critical tool of aesthetic and so moral boundary-reinforcement. Central to this argument is Plato’s consistent use of terms like ἀηδής and δυσχέρεια , which both convey visceral repulsion and moral rejection of their objects.