Eco-label selection and information sharing in green supply chains under demand uncertainty: A perspective on two types of green products

In this study, we explored retailer's information sharing strategies for two types of green products with different cost structures; development-intensive green products (DIGPs) and marginal cost-intensive green products (MIGPs), as well as the eco-label choice dilemma faced by supply chain members of these two products between corporate self-label strategy (SLS) and government certification-label strategy (CLS). We considered a retail-channel green supply chain consisting of the government, a manufacturer, and a retailer, where the government implements environmental regulations, the manufacturer produces green products, and the retailer forecasts stochastic demand. We established a multistage game model of information sharing and non-sharing under the two eco-labels and derived the equilibrium solutions for the two products. The results showed that information asymmetry affects the greenness of DIGP under SLS, but does not change the greenness of MIGP. Information sharing always increases the manufacturer's profit while reducing the retailer's, with incremental gains and losses increasing as forecast accuracy improves. Furthermore, retailer's information sharing strategy does not alter MIGP stakeholders' eco-label preferences, but does influence DIGP manufacturer's eco-label choice. Notably, the government subsidizes green products, and the subsidy level is contingent on product characteristics and eco-label types. These results help enterprises develop appropriate product strategies and governments formulate effective eco-label policies.