Labor market dynamics and wage inequalityExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesOccupational and Professional Licensing Regulation

Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun, N. Bugra Ozel

2026.3.4REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag016

Abstract

We find widespread evidence that firms avoid overtime payments by strategically assigning “managerial” titles. Exploiting the exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find managerial titles increase almost fivefold just above the overtime pay cutoff, including suspect listings, such as “Director of First Impressions” for a role equivalent to “Front-Desk Clerk.” Avoidance is higher when firms have more bargaining power and are financially constrained. It is also more common in occupations with volatile demand and unpredictable worker scheduling. Patterns align with litigation and Department of Labor enforcement. Firms avoid roughly 13.5% in compensation costs, hiring strategic “managers.” (JEL M51, M54, G30, G38)

Citation format

COHEN, Lauren; GURUN, Umit G.; OZEL, N. Bugra. Too many managers: The strategic use of titles to avoid overtime payments. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2026.