Sobre la defensa de las intuiciones filosóficas

In the philosophical tradition, it is widely accepted that intuitions frequently serve as a primary source of guidance in our reasoning, particularly in the context of complex and abstract problems. Consequently, certain philosophers contend that intuitions possess a distinctive epistemic function and are capable of furnishing authentic insight into philosophical dilemmas. Nevertheless, this conventional approach has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly with regard to the reliability of intuitions. Indeed, recent developments in the field of experimental philosophy have called into question the universality of these intuitive thoughts, demonstrating their variability across different cultures and individuals.  However, this critique, while significant, disregards a pivotal element: intuitions are not static phenomena, but are modified, refined, and evaluated within the context of philosophical praxis. In this sense, Ernest Sosa’s proposal can shed light on the role of intuitions and how they fit into competent philosophical work.