Kant on Provisional Property Rights and the Idea of General Will

The provisionality of property in the Kantian state of nature implies two things:‎firstly, its rights status is deficient, meaning property is not a fully valid right,‎ and secondly, possession of external objects is normatively significant, i.e., it ‎produces certain legal effects. This paper focuses on the normative aspect of‎ the provisionality. I show that normativity of provisional possession is neither ‎the result of the Postulate and the permissive law, nor of the ‘anticipated’ general ‎will in the civil condition, but of the ‘a priori’ and ‘originally’ united will ‎of all in the state of nature. Accordingly, we must distinguish between two instantiations ‎of the general will: one in the state of nature, and another in the ‎civil condition. The latter is, however, not just a ‘reflection’ of the former: the‎ general will in the state of nature does not already recognize property rights ‎over objects, but only makes our unilateral property claims to external objects‎ morally valid. Only the state can provide the title to property rights. Although ‎its role is not just to ‘recognize’ and ‘secure’ what we possess in the state of ‎nature, the actual general will in the civil condition remains, to some extent,‎ normatively bound by the ‘originally united will’ in the state of nature.‎