‘Neuronal representation’ is not a defective concept: Ambiguity as a sign of science in progress

In recent years, more and more papers have critically analyzed the concept of ‘representation’ in neuroscience and concluded that its ambiguity and imprecision constitute serious, perhaps even fatal, flaws (e.g. Baker et al., 2022; Favela & Machery, 2023; Pohl et al., 2025). Here we use the literature on ambiguous concepts in philosophy of science (e.g. Brigandt, 2010; Haueis, 2024; Novick, 2023) to motivate a very different conclusion. We first step back and ask why such an ambiguous concept would be so widely used among scientists. We suggest that it serves a primary epistemic goal of neuroscience: to explain how cognitive capacities arise. We note that it is still unclear what form(s) successful explanations will take, and chart several philosophical and scientific debates on this matter. Because ‘representation’ denotes findings that contribute to such explanations, its ambiguity necessarily reflects the uncertainty currently inherent in the field. Our analysis of ‘representation’ suggests that its ambiguity cannot be resolved through philosophical analysis or substitution with other concepts alone. Instead, more empirical work is needed to help clarify through successful research how to achieve neuroscience’s epistemic goals.