Post-Soviet Geopolitical DynamicsGlobal Energy Security and PolicyChina's Global Influence and Migration

S. Safaryan, Murat Özay Taşkın, B. Khuroshvili, Ilia Keshelava

2026.2.20China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies

DOI: 10.1142/s2377740026500016

Abstract

Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has steadily expanded its presence in the South Caucasus, inviting closer scrutiny of its evolving regional role. Long shaped by Russian and Western influence, the region is now witnessing the rise of China as a cautious yet increasingly consequential actor. A comparative assessment of Beijing’s engagement with Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan underscores the differentiated and adaptive character of this involvement. Drawing on document analysis and expert interviews, the analysis examines Beijing’s political, economic, and normative instruments of influence, with particular attention to how its approach is calibrated to the distinct geopolitical circumstances and developmental trajectories of each state. The evidence points to a multivector, non-confrontational strategy anchored in economic pragmatism, strategic neutrality, and incremental softpower expansion. In Armenia, China advances its presence through low-profile diplomacy, expanding trade, and cultural outreach. In Georgia, it leverages the country’s transit potential while navigating domestic political sensitivities and Western scrutiny. In Azerbaijan, Beijing has deepened strategic cooperation in energy and connectivity, complemented by growing political and security ties. Direct rivalry with Moscow is carefully avoided, yet the three South Caucasus states are approached as sovereign actors rather than as extensions of Russian influence. The opportunities and structural constraints shaping this engagement suggest a measured but persistent regional entry—one that reflects an emerging model of great-power projection defined less by coercion than by calibrated flexibility.

Citation format

SAFARYAN, S., et al. China's interests, instruments, and limits in the south caucasus since 2013. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 2026, 12(01n02): 1–27.