Wittgenstein’s Kōan and Kenshō about Absolute Value

Abstract In Wittgenstein’s early remarks on value and the mystical, we find a particular philosophical problem that I shall call ‘Wittgenstein’s Kōan’. The problem emerges because Wittgenstein holds three prima facie incompatible claims: the totality of what exists is the totality of facts, that is, the world; absolute value cannot be part of the world; yet there are experiences, such as the experience of wonder at the existence of the world, that somehow seem to have absolute value. In this paper I shall argue that this problem should be treated like a Zen’s kōan, that is, a paradox that can’t be solved through canonical discursive moves but requires a non-discursive experiential breakthrough, what is called ‘kenshō’ in Zen Buddhism. To support this contention, I shall argue that canonical discursive solutions are exegetically or theoretically implausible or both and I shall describe the key experiential breakthrough which Wittgenstein lived and made him feel that there is indeed a kōan to be explored and solved. In this way, the paper intends to contribute to the ever-growing interest in the dialogue between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Zen Buddhism.