Defending Academic Freedom or Defending Academic Autonomy? On the Usefulness of the Concept of Academic Freedom

The concept of academic freedom is the subject of growing interest. However, it tends to be defined in different, and even contradictory terms. This raises the question of whether the notion provides a sufficiently solid foundation for theoretical reflection and collective action. This article argues that the definitions of academic freedom are closely linked to public debates about the roles that are socially assigned to academics, and the way they should do their job. As such, these definitions are components of both political struggles about the relevance, or lack thereof, of scientific activities for society, and intellectual struggles about the professional standards that should govern scientific activities. Such a heavily-loaded notion appears ill-suited for conceptualisation, and is also likely to prove counterproductive, paradoxically, for actors that aim to defend it. The relevant struggle should be less about defending academic freedom, a category of practice that has become slippery, than about defending academic autonomy, understood as the capacity for academia in general and scientific disciplines in particular to retain control over the norms governing their own activities.