On Aristotle’s Instrumentalism: Can Reason Set Goals

The article is devoted to the study of the history of the concept of moral dignity in philoso­phy. Such an inquiry is associated with a number of difficulties arising from the polysemy of the concept, as well as methodological issues linked to this complexity. At the center of the article lies the understanding of dignity as a universal and inalienable inner value (and/or status) of the human being, which justifies the demand for recognition and respect in human relations. The formation of a refined concept is analyzed through the use of a “ret­rospective” method, which makes it possible to trace the premises of this understanding of dignity in the history of thought. The article focuses on the interpretations of dignity in Cicero, Pufendorf, and Kant, which establish a certain line in the conceptual develop­ment. Through the lens of Kant’s mature conception of dignity, the reflections of Pufendorf and Cicero are examined. The example of Cicero’s philosophy shows that even early notions of dignity, albeit in embryonic form, already contained important premises later elaborated in the early modern period.