Minhui Hu
Abstract
Renegotiation after software development is widely adopted by firms to mitigate uncertainties in IT outsourcing. This study examines the design and choice of fixed-price versus performance-based contracts in scenarios where firms may renegotiate software debugging time with the IT vendor after development. Through a contract-renegotiation model, we find that without renegotiation, despite incurring a higher contracting cost, the performance-based contract increases the profit of the firm by regulating the vendor’s debugging effort, compared to the fixed-price contract. Renegotiation generates two key effects: the uncertainty-resolving effect (addressing development uncertainties) and the effort-incentivizing effect (stimulating the vendor’s effort), which collectively enhance the firm’s profit. Interestingly, when renegotiation is introduced, the uncertainty-resolving effect renders the ex-ante effort regulation of performance-based contract ineffective. Consequently, considering the higher contracting costs of performance-based contracts and the dual benefits of renegotiation, the firm prefers a fixed-price contract ex ante while renegotiating with the vendor ex post. • This paper examines the design and choice between fixed-price and performance-based contracts with renegotiation. • We find that renegotiation generates uncertainty-resolving and effort-incentivizing effects, both of which benefit the firm, and the uncertainty-resolving effect renders the ex ante effort regulation of the performance-based contract ineffective. • This work bridges a key discrepancy between theoretical research and business practice: while theoretical models suggest that performance-based contracts provide stronger incentives to IT vendors, fixed-price contracts are more prevalent in practice. • We propose an optimal outsourcing strategy for the firm: entering into a fixed-price contract with the IT vendor ex ante, and renegotiating initial contract after software development.
Citation format
HU, Minhui. Fixed-price or performance-based? Contract design with renegotiation for IT outsourcing. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 2026, 11(1): 131–148.