Representation and the Limits of Reason in Habermas’s Theory of Popular Sovereignty

ABSTRACT Habermas’s theory of popular sovereignty has attracted both praise and opprobrium but surprisingly little critical analysis. This article looks to remedy this omission, by locating what Habermas says about popular sovereignty within the context of his broader philosophical project. My analysis reveals that popular sovereignty plays a crucial role in Habermas’s account of the “rationalisation of the lifeworld” in modern liberal democracies, by mediating between the “facticity” of existing political cultures and the “normativity” of universalistic principles of political morality. This interpretation raises a challenge, however, since in order for popular sovereignty to play this mediating role, advocates of universalistic principles must be able to successfully claim to be representing “the people.” Yet such claims take us beyond the scope of communicative rationality, and point instead to the symbolic dimension of democracy. Taking the judicial review of legislation as an example, I argue that it is possible for a political decision to be justified in terms of communicative rationality and yet nevertheless have symbolic connotations that hinder the ability of citizens to view themselves as equal participants in the process of democratic self-government. I conclude by suggesting that my analysis demonstrates a limit to the process of the rationalisation of the lifeworld which Habermas fails to acknowledge.