Subjective Potency, Objective Potency, and the Semantic Distinction between essentia and esse in Hervaeus Natalis

In the texts in which he discusses the relationship between essence ( essentia ) and existing ( esse ), Hervaeus Natalis rejects Henry of Ghent’s intentional distinction and Giles of Rome’s real distinction. The Dominican instead adopts Godfrey of Fontaines’s distinction according to modes of signifying. This article argues that the distinction between objective potency and subjective potency is a key element in Hervaeus’s rejection of opposing views on the distinction between the creature’s essence and esse . It also proposes that paying attention to the subjective/objective potency distinction highlights philosophical commitments of the three takes in discussion. Finally, the article argues that the highlighting of those ontological principles sheds new light on various questions regarding Thomas Aquinas’s view on the esse / essentia distinction.