Kant and Kitcher on Whether There is a Theoretical Basis for Human Freedom

Abstract There is an immense recent literature on issues concerning the development of Kant’s philosophy and the relation between theoretical and practical grounds for asserting absolute freedom. One important recent contribution to this issue is a series of writings by Patricia Kitcher. In this context I focus on three closely related works, namely, Chapter 14 from her book, Kant’s Thinker, “Is Kant’s Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?” and two later essays, “A Kantian Argument for the Formula of Humanity,” and “Kant’s Practical Proof of the Fact of Freedom.” See Kitcher (2011), Kitcher (2017), and Kitcher (2023). It is not possible on this occasion to discuss her other work on related topics, such as Kitcher (2004).I argue in support of Kitcher’s general position that Kant shifts away, quite properly, from an emphasis on purely theoretical grounds. In view of the importance and complexity of the notion of transcendental freedom, however, I also point out some remaining problems in Kitcher’s work as well as in Kant’s final position.