Social Capital, Community Resilience, and Faith-Based Organizations in Disaster Recovery: A Case Study of Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church

Because governmental structures put in place to mitigate disaster risks and aid communities in the disaster recovery process have, at times, proven to be inadequate, reliance on other types of organizations is necessary for some communities to survive. Although there are a number of different actors that played a role in the reestablishment of communities within New Orleans since Hurricane Katrina took place, the Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) Catholic Church is a prime example of how a community-based organization stepped in to address the needs of its community. This article examines how MQVN garnered social capital within its surrounding community to pursue successful community development in the absence of and opposition to governmental support and political resistance. This article will first review the government failure and decrease in civic trust that fostered a robust third-sector response in disaster recovery and redevelopment. Then, using social capital theory, the article supports the notion that civic distrust and confidence is derived from government and institutional performance, rather than increasing individualism or declining social trust. Finally, implications for federal disaster policy and third-sector disaster interventions are proposed. In August of 2005, Hurricane Katina struck the Gulf Coast, flooding 80 percent of the City of New Orleans (Associated Press, 2005). Until Superstorm Sandy, this disaster was seen as the most destructive natural disaster to impact the United States in recorded history. The disaster illustrated the social vulnerability of urban populations living in hazard prone regions, serving as a vivid reminder to developed nations that regardless of a nation’s level of development, their communities are still vulnerable to severe natural phenomena. Moreover, the disaster illustrated that a community’s vulnerability to disasters was not only a product of the built environment’s varying resistance to disasters and a community’s physical proximity to hazards, but also a byproduct of social dynamics that contribute to the vulnerability of populations (Cutter et al., 2008; Miller & Rivera, 2008). The subsequent effects of these social dynamics, when placed under the pressure of a severe natural disaster, illustrates to both the directly affected communities and the rest of the nation, that organizational,