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Open AccessEconomicsComputer Science

Core in a simple coalition formation game

Suryapratim Banerjee, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sönmez

2001.10.17SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE

DOI: 10.1007/s003550000067

tlooto Summary

The core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition is analyzed, and two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence of a core allocation are introduced.

Abstract

Abstract is not available.

Citation format

BANERJEE, Suryapratim; KONISHI, Hideo; SÖNMEZ, Tayfun. Core in a simple coalition formation game. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2001, 18: 135–153.