Open AccessComputer ScienceEconomicsBusiness

Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar

2017.9.26ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

DOI: 10.1145/3530799

tlooto Summary

The “monopolistic auction” is analyzed, showing its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one’s value) diminishes as the number of bids increases.

Abstract

The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin’s challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin’s pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [16], showing (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one’s value) diminishes as the number of bids increases.

Citation format

LAVI, Ron; SATTATH, Or; ZOHAR, Aviv. Redesigning bitcoin's fee market [preprint]. arXiv, 2017. arXiv:1709.08881.