Success and knowledge-how

lVAodern epistemologists don't often discuss knowledge-how?propositional knowledge has attracted the lion's share of attention.1 Yet the notion of knowledge how looks useful elsewhere in philoso? phy?philosophers of science discuss tacit knowledge and skills, philosophers of mind disagree about whether knowing what an experience is like is a matter of knowing how to imagine or recognize it, and phi? losophers of language and of value con? sider whether knowledge of meaning or morality is knowledge-how (to use words, to follow rules, to behave well).2 Without a fuller understanding of knowledge-how, it is difficult to assess these proposals. Moreover, knowledge-how is interesting qua species of knowledge?when set alongside theories of propositional knowl? edge, enquiry into other forms of knowl? edge promises to shed light on the nature of knowledge quite generally. What is it that we value about our interactions with the world, whether these interactions are through belief or through action? Following Gilbert Ryle (1949), those epistemologists who have discussed knowledge-how have often been concerned primarily with the relationship between knowledge-how and propositional knowl? edge. Most recently, for example, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) have argued that knowledge-how is a cer? tain type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. This paper describes a differ? ent approach, one which tackles knowledge how more directly. Just as propositional knowledge can be understood in terms of true belief plus warrant, knowledge-how can be understood in terms of successful action