Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. xii, 311

the costs to the EC of its own export subsidy programme would exacerbate tensions between member states who are major beneficiaries of the CAP's export subsidies (France) and those who are not (Britain). Such intra-Community discord would not be tolerable and would drive the EC to the negotiating table and to major concessions. Libby's documentation that this was the line of reasoning that lay behind the EEP is persuasive. Less convincing is his conclusion that the EEP was effective—both in persuading the EC to agree to discuss its CAP as part of the Uruguay Round, and later to concede the need for a long-term reduction in its export subsidies. This is not to deny that the EEP escalated the costs of EC agricultural expenditures, and to a level that, at least for Great Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was unacceptable. But by Libby's own account, the controversy between France and Great Britain over the cost of the CAP preceded the EEP. And as with the compromise that was reached in the early 1980s and which resulted in the implementation of dairy quotas, that reached to deal with the budgetary crisis of 1987-1988 was one that was Communitymade and driven by internal Community priorities, goals and politics. While Libby is very conscious of the primacy of internal forces in driving EC agricultural policy, his commitment to mercantilism as a trade policy leads him to exaggerate the EEP's effectiveness, and to insist that but for unanticipated events-the 1987-1988 drought-it would have been a total success. Libby endorses the EEP and a mercantilist trade policy as an appropriate and effective economic policy to advance US national interests —in this case, national economic security. But rarely is the staie a cohesive whole, and rarely is there unanimity on what is in a nation's best interests. A matter defined to be one of national interest too often reflects nothing more than the interests of dominant societal groups. Libby's own documentation reveals that the major beneficiaries of the EEP have been the private grain traders, especially Cargill and Continental. One might well ask in what sense the national interest of the US has been served by a policy that has cost the US taxpayer in excess of $4 billion dollars and which, in the absence of a multilateral reduction in agricultural subsidies and trade barriers, is claimed by American agricultural interests as an entitlement. One wishes that Professor Libby had the same critical understanding of the influential role of politically mobilized, domestic economic interests in shaping US trade policy and external relations that he has revealed with respect to the EC and its CAP. These minor criticisms aside, Protecting Markets provides a refreshing alternative perspective to the predominantly liberal views that have dominated analyses of agricultural trade reform.