The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945–1989

giving this volume broad coverage of the period. Space limits do not permit an assessment of the many interesting contributions, so only a few can be mentioned. Svetlana Savranskaya of the National Security Archive and George Washington University contributes an insightful piece on the ‘Unintended Consequences’ that the Soviet decision to sign the accord produced. Wanda Jarzabek explores Polish decision-making in the process, while Marie-Pierre Rey offers a similar essay on France. As with all edited volumes, there is no single overarching argument, so readers looking for a single narrative on the CSCE will have to look elsewhere. However, the editors do emphasise three main themes in their summary of the volume: bilateral relations between the key nations involved; the role that their perceptions played in the process; and the extent of communication between East and West about shared goals. The authors mainly focus on the time period before 1975, looking at the origins of Helsinki. While interesting, more discussion of its consequences would have been worthwhile. Nonetheless, this is an original and insightful contribution to what promises to become one of the more interesting topics in Cold War history: the role of CSCE and Helsinki in transforming the Cold War.