The Future of Human Nature

Famous living philosophers rarely take a stand on the kind of moral dilemmas that arise from the current boom in developments in the biosciences. Jürgen Habermas’s book The Future of Human Nature does not offer a formula for rules that ought to govern biotechnological manipulation of the human genome that are already feasible or that may become so in the future. Rather than putting forward definitive answers to urgent problems, Habermas is engaged in a reflective search for the general principles that could guide the way we deal with particular problems. Habermas starts from the idea that not all types of manipulation of human nature ought to be allowed, and looks for the general ethical reasons as to why certain manipulations ought to be out of the question. He thus takes a clear stand in the ongoing debate over whether the manipulation of human nature should be ethically regulated or whether we can proceed ‘‘arbitrarily according to subjective preferences whose satisfaction depends on the market’’ (p. 12). While Habermas refers to specific issues, for example the procedure of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which provides a diagnosis of genetic defects in embryos brought about by artificial fertilization, before they are implanted in the womb; and research on human embryonic stem cells which are thus ‘‘consumed’’ (‘‘verbrauchende Embryonenforschung ’’), it soon becomes clear that Habermas does not isolate such cases in order to evaluate them alone. Instead, he considers them as steps in a more general, gradual process of ‘‘auto-transformation of the species’’ (p. 21), because they are techniques that pave the way to ‘‘positive eugenics’’, in other words to our being able to choose our children’s desired genetic characteristics (p. 19). It is vital to note that Habermas does not rule out the possibility of ‘‘negative eugenics’’, despite the fact that he regards the boundaries between positive and negative eugenics to be fluid, and seeks their normative regulation. Thus, the use of genetics should not be forbidden a priori in cases where it might prevent considerable harm (e.g. incurable or especially serious diseases), as long as a ‘‘clinical attitude’’ is adopted in such interventions, and we can reasonably presuppose the consent of the person the embryo will