The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay

Consciousness is a pivotal notion in Locke's Essay.1 It matters to his accounts of personal identity, sensitive knowledge, his version of the cogito argument, memory, and it is one factor in his argument against innate ideas. Nevertheless, Locke's notion of consciousness presents an interpretive puzzle: important passages on consciousness in the Essay have proved hard to reconcile.2 Some have thought that Locke meant to identify consciousness with perception in general. According to this view, all thinking is merely a modification of consciousness, and consciousness plays no independent role in Locke's theory of the mind.3 Others have suggested that because consciousness involves some kind of awareness of mental states, Locke should be understood to identify consciousness with reflection.4 Still others have argued that although both entail some sort of awareness of thinking, consciousness and reflection should be under stood to be different perceptual acts. The distinguishing feature is that reflection seems to require an act of will or attention where conscious ness does not.5 None of these interpretations of Locke is satisfactory. Locke is attributed either a theory of consciousness insufficient for the role he assigns it or he is interpreted to have a theory that contradicts other important commitments, such as his commitment to the paucity of reflective abilities in children or to his empiricist principle that all ideas originate in sensation and reflection.6 The latter two problems have led to charges that Locke's theories of consciousness and reflection are incoherent.7 Nevertheless, Locke can meet all of his commitments as well as avoid any incoherence once consciousness is interpreted as a special kind of reflexive and proprietary perception internal to any perception of an idea.