Why some things should not be for sale: the moral limits of markets

focused on von Neumann and Morgenstern, now after the publication of Theory of Games. Indeed, here are some issues that I would have liked to know more about: Why did von Neumann so promptly abandon his ‘new social mathematics, providing analytical insight into the exercise of power and discrimination,’ first for military consultancy and later for computer science? Why did Morgenstern rather quickly give up the promotion of game theory among economists? What perception did von Neumann and Morgenstern have of the significance of their book 5 or 10 years after its publication? What processes led to the second (1947) and third (1953) editions of Theory of Games? What was, exactly, the relationship between von Neumann and Nash? Although Leonard discusses some of these issues, in my opinion this is not done with the same degree of care and depth that characterized the first 11 chapters of the book. But I do not want to conclude this review on a negative note. Despite what seems to me a few imperfections, Leonard’s book is masterfully documented and brilliantly written, and constitutes the true pinnacle of his long and exemplary research on the founders of game theory.